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Abstract
Regulation of aviation's contribution to the global problem of climate change is in-
creasingly likely in the near term, but the method agreed upon by most economists-a
multi-sectoral market-based approach such as a cap and trade system-is opposed by
industry stakeholders. An efficient economy-wide policy would determine the optimal
level of sectoral emissions reductions, but industry groups have instead proposed in-
dependent aviation-sector goals for carbon mitigation and technology adoption. This
thesis asks the question: how much should airlines reduce their emissions, and which
technologies will be necessary to achieve those reductions.
In order to comprehend the problem of mitigation costs and outcomes within the
context of the global economy, I introduce an aviation-resolved version of the MIT
Emissions Prediction and Policy Analysis model; a computable general equilibrium
model of the global economy. In EPPA-A, the social accounting matrix is re-balanced
to include aviation, a non-unity income elasticity of demand is introduced, and sub-
stitution elasticity parameters are estimated. Additionally, I include an additional
module to analyze the potential non-market impacts of government infrastructure on
aviation emissions by explicitly modeling an advanced Air Traffic Control sector.
Several policy scenarios are applied to the model including: an idealized economy-
wide cap and trade system in each developed nation or region, and an aviation-sector-
only cap within an economy-wide cap, both with and without trading enabled between
the aviation cap and the economy-wide cap. Each policy scenario is compared to a
business-as-usual case, and relative welfare loss under each policy is calculated. The
business-as-usual and economy-wide cap policies are also run with the advanced Air
Traffic Control module enabled, and the efficacy is determined.
I find that in the context of total economic welfare, the method of aviation reg-
ulation is of little significance; the differences in results among the different policy
scenarios are very small (on the order of 0.002% in the U.S.). However, the price of
aviation and sector output are more responsive. When trading between an aviation-
sector-only cap and the economy-wide cap is enabled, outcomes are practically iden-
tical. When trading is not allowed, the price of aviation increases 21.8%, and output
falls 32.8% compared to the economy-wide policy-only case. I find that national
welfare outcomes are sensitive to international trade, and border adjustments for avi-
ation emissions are important. Finally, the efficacy of advanced Air Traffic Control
infrastructure, and the economic welfare gained or lost, is sensitive to the parameter
estimates which exhibit high uncertainty. I find that the low-efficacy parameters re-
sult in slightly lower fuel intensity, but are also net-welfare decreasing, while the high
parameter estimates increase welfare, but result in an infeasible reduction in sectoral
energy intensity.
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Title: Senior Lecturer, Sloan School of Management
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Civil aviation is an essential and growing component of the global economy, and is
also one of the fastest growing sectoral sources of greenhouse gas emissions. But in
the context of the global problem of climate change, aviation is also a relatively small
contributor, responsible for about 3% of total anthropogenic warming in 1992 (Penner
et al., 1999). It is important that any climate policy strike a balance between emissions
reductions and the costs of abatement, but while economists generally agree that an
economy-wide market-based instruments (such as a cap & trade scheme or carbon
tax) are the most economically efficient methods of regulation, stakeholders such as
the Air Transport Association oppose aviation's inclusion in market-wide regulation
in favor of an industry-administered sectoral policy. The global sectoral "cap," would
allow emissions growth until 2020, but then disallow any future growth in emissions
from the aviation sector (ATA, 2010). In general, economic theory predicts that this
type of sectoral cap would be a more costly policy proposal than an economy-wide
policy would be. This study tests that assertion using a global Computable General
Equilibrium (CGE) model while adding some additional considerations of non-market
aspects of the aviation sector such as the potential for advanced air traffic control.
The role of aviation in the economy is relatively small in national accounting terms,
but the services provided by aviation-rapid, long-distance, low-cost transport-
enable and facilitate a large, and growing portion of domestic and international com-
merce (FAA, 2008). The measured income elasticity of demand for aviation consis-
tently shows greater-than-unity estimates, predicting an increased share of aviation
in future consumption. These estimates, driven by historical trends lead forecasters
to anticipate sustained growth in demand for air travel (ICAO, 2008; FAA, 2011).
But aviation emissions present one potential barrier to future growth. Commercial
aircraft nearly universally rely on kerosene-type jet fuels, and regulation of their un-
avoidable byproducts of combustion-carbon dioxide and other pollutants-poses the
risk of increased costs of production. Unlike land transport, however, the aviation
sector has few alternative power sources which will be commercially available in the
near term.
Because climate change is a global problem, the solutions must be international
and pan-sectoral in scope. Therefore, the motivation of climate change policy analysis
is the problem of finding policy prescriptions which mitigate greenhouse gas emission
while reducing social costs of that policy, while seeking to understand the dominant
drivers of policy cost and innovate upon policy options. Where the aviation sector
is technologically constrained and likely faces high mitigation costs relative to other
economic sectors, aviation emissions are a relatively minor source of anthropogenic
warming. This analysis seeks to determine how and to what extent the aviation sector
should play a role in GHG mitigation efforts.
In order to assess the impacts of climate policy on the aviation sector in a globally-
comprehensive, and social-welfare-oriented context, I adapt the MIT Emissions Pre-
diction and Policy Analysis (EPPA) model for analysis of the global aviation sector
(Paltsev et al., 2005). EPPA provides a consistent framework for tracking the effects
of climate policies on different commodity prices, and on intermediate and final de-
mand for the products of economic sectors. EPPA for Aviation (EPPA-A) specifically
models the aviation sector in each region, and endogenously calculates prices of and
demand for aviation based on the requirements of a given climate policy. An addi-
tional module allows for a government-supplied advanced Air Traffic Control (ATC)
infrastructure and considers both the social cost and benefits of such non-market
allocations.
Policies considered in this thesis are designed to represent the likely outcomes
of proposals by relevant stakeholders, and produce results which bear on the costs
and benefits, both to the aviation sector, and to society as a whole. An idealized
cap & trade policy for the industrialized world represents the recommendations of
economic theory, while policies including sectoral caps for aviation represent those
favored by the Air Transport Association (ATA) in the U.S. and internationally by
the International Air Transport Association (IATA).
In Chapter 2, I present in greater detail the relevant economic and technological
relationships between aviation and climate change, including the technological ad-
vancements which are commonly anticipated to curb emissions growth, and a back-
ground to the theory and application of policy instruments to the problem of climate
externalities. In Chapter 3, I introduce a methodology for general equilibrium anal-
ysis of various policies. In Chapter 4, I discuss the policies applied in the model
in greater detail, and present the results in Chapter 5. A conclusion, including the
discernible policy recommendations, follows in chapter 6.
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Chapter 2
Background
2.1 Aviation and the Global Economy
According to the 2002 Benchmark Input-Output table for the United States (BEA,
2008), as a share of total consumption, aviation is relatively small-less than 1% of
U.S. GDP in 2002. But the commerce which aviation enables, combined with its
unique capacity to provide high-speed intercontinental travel, makes aviation activi-
ties important to the structure of the economy. Business use of aviation, which is not
counted in GDP, is a large part of aviation-sector output,' and as a mode of shipping,
aviation is increasingly important. A study by Hummels (2007) finds that from 1965
to 2004 the value share of air transport in all U.S. exports excluding North America
has grown to a total share of 52.8% in 2004, while the share for imports was 36.0%
in 2000.
The increasingly important role of aviation in the global economy has been repeat-
edly demonstrated by econometric measurements of the income elasticity for demand
of aviation which show a positive, greater-than-unity estimates. While in some mar-
kets, studies have made sub-unity estimates of income elasticity (Abrahams, 1983;
Savage et al., 1995), the majority studies find that in general, greater amounts of avi-
ation are consumed when income grows (Gillen et al., 2003; Taplin, 1980; Alperovich
'According to the 2002 Use Summary table (BEA, 2008), the value of intermediate (non-
government, non-household) consumption of air transportation was 33.2% of total sectoral output.
and Machnes, 1994; Njegovan, 2006). In a meta-analysis of 139 individual estimates
of income elasticity Gillen et al. (2003) find a median estimate of 1.39. Based on
these elasticities forecasters predict a growing share of aviation in the global economy
as incomes grow in the future: the FAA (2011) forecasts domestic revenue-passenger
kilometers (RPKs) to more than double over the next 20 years, and ICAO (2008)
forecasts total global RPKs of over three times higher over the same period.
2.2 Barriers to Growth
2.2.1 Fuel Prices
While demand for aviation has been growing, the increase in fuel prices over the last
decade have substantially altered the cost structure for airlines. According to the
IATA (2011), the price of jet fuel on April 8, 2011 was 3.91 times higher than the
average price for 2000. With increasing fuel prices, the fuel share of airline operating
costs has more than doubled in recent years. The IATA (2010) estimates that the
share of fuel expenses as a percentage of total operating costs among all major world
airlines more than doubled from 13.6% in 2001 to 32.3% in 2008. While 2009 data
from the Bureau of Transportation Statistics (compiled by Swelbar and Belobaba)
shows that among U.S. airlines this share declined to 27%, according to the United
States Energy Information Administration (2011) average fuel prices for 2011 are
expected to be even higher than 2008 averages.
2.2.2 Aviation Emissions
In addition to the problems of oil scarcity, airlines currently rely on technologies
which produce climate damages through a number of mechanisms. Though emissions
of CO2 are currently unregulated, uncertainty about the costs of GHG emissions
in future climate policies drive industry concerns of new costs with few mitigation
opportunities (May, 2009a,b). Faced with these new constraints, stakeholders and
policymakers are actively engaged in shaping the future of aviation.
Penner et al. (1999) project that over the next several decades, aviation will be one
of the fastest-growing anthropogenic sources of greenhouse gases. While calculating
aviation's share of total anthropogenic radiative forcing in 1992 at 3%2 the IPCC
estimates the total combined effects of aviation activities' warming will by 5% of
global anthropogenic warming by 2050 (Penner et al., 1999; IPCC).
While carbon dioxide is the primary emissions product of concern, burning jet fuel
produces many other gases and particles. Following the FAA (2005), emissions prod-
ucts and their mass shares are listed in Table 2.1. Carbon dioxide makes up about
70% of combustion products by mass. The balance of emissions are made up by water
vapor (slightly less than 30%) and trace amounts of other gases (less than 1% each).
Water vapor also acts as an atmospheric greenhouse gas, its direct contribution to
warming is small. However, according to Penner et al. (1999), water vapor plays a
direct role in almost all subsequent atmospheric chemistry, and in contrail and thin
cirrus cloud formation. Of the remaining emissions products, the amount produced is
very small relative to the total, and none act as directly as greenhouse gases though
they are important pollutants for human health, and NO, emissions specifically are
important for their climatological effects as NO, is a precursor to ozone. Signifi-
cant industry and government effort to control emissions of carbon monoxide, sulfur
oxides, non-methane volatile organic compounds, and particulate matters have had
some success in reducing emissions (FAA, 2005; ICAO, 2009; Taylor, 2009). However
according to FAA (2005), NO, formation remains difficult to control. Bower and
Kroo (2008) explain that engines have reached levels of efficiency where performance
characteristics such as NO, reduction and fuel efficiency exist as a trade-off.
2Initially the supplemental report, "Aviation and the Global Atmosphere" estimated the share
of emissions at 3.5%. In the subsequent 4 th assessment report, this figure was revised to 3%
Aviation Emissions Products
Carbon Dioxide CO 2  ~-70%
Water Vapor H20 >30%
Nitrogen Oxides NO2 >1%
Volatile Organic Compounds VOC >1%
Carbon Monoxide CO >1%
Sulfur Oxides SOx >1%
Particulates BC, OC >1%
Table 2.1: Emissions products of aviation and approximate mass fractions
Complicating the problem of aviation emissions is the difference between ground
level emissions and emissions that occur throughout the troposphere. Penner et al.
(1999) find that upper-tropospheric emissions of ozone precursors more efficient gen-
erators of ozone, and Barrett et al. (2010) conclude that through complex atmospheric
chemistry cruising-altitude emissions could also be important contributors of surface-
level pollutants. Finally, emissions of non-GHGs at cruising altitude may lead to the
formation of thin cirrus clouds which trap heat and displace naturally occurring (and
heat-reflecting clouds). Burkhardt and Karcher (2011) find that this effect may have
a greater global-warming potential (GWP) than GHG emissions.
2.3 Technological Solutions
Aviation technologies in use are mature, and are the product of extensive research
and development programs, but homogeneous in their reliance of kerosene-type jet
fuel. Since its introduction the turbofan has undergone significant incremental im-
provements in fuel efficiency, but no new fuels have been introduced for use (Lee
et al., 2001; Hummels, 2007). Unlike land and sea transportation, air transporta-
tion is marked by a distinct lack of alternate modes and very low diversity of power
sources. Thus, while alternative fuels and powertrains, as well as alternative modes
are relatively certain near-term alternatives for land transport, solutions in aviation
are much more limited (GAO).
Alternative aviation fuel technologies include fuels bases on alternative fossil fuels
(oil sands, Fischer-Tropsch fuels), fuels based on plant oils (either oxygenated 'bio-
diesel,' or de-oxygenated hydroprocessed renewable jet; HRJ), and alcohol-based jet
fuels. Hileman et al. (2009) find that only three are identified as likely near-term
alternative fuels (next ten years): conventional jet fuel produced from oil sands,
Fischer-Tropsch fuels from coal, natural gas (or potentially biomass), and HRJ from
renewable oils. Only HRJ fuel comes from a renewable source, and according to
Stratton et al. (2010), could potentially reduce net carbon emissions on a well-to-
wake basis (the two alternative fossil fuels are likely to yield moderate to substantial
increases in emissions), however estimates of the net emissions of each fuel type are
highly sensitive to uncertainty about land use change. Unfortunately, land is a scarce
resource, and biofuels are likely to compete with agriculture for arable land(Melillo
et al., 2009). Furthermore, renewable jet fuel producers would have to compete with
other renewable diesel producers for feedstocks, but compared to diesel fuel for land
transport, aviation fuel must meet more stringent specifications, and therefore sees
higher marginal costs (Hemighaus et al., 2004).
New airframes and materials have the potential to increase aircraft fuel efficiencies
significantly, but according to Spitz et al. (2001), aircraft development cycles take a
very long amount of time and current efforts to reduce the development cycle are not
likely to meet their targets. Nonetheless, the GAO identifies the blended wing-body
airframe (BWB), as an airframe that could deliver 33% efficiency gains over current
airframes. Composite Materials are already included in several new airframes to a
varied extent, notably in the Boeing 787 and the Airbus A380. Composites allow
planes to be built lighter and stronger, and their continued integration into airframes
is a source of future efficiency improvements. For example, large parts of the Boeing
787's fuselage and wings are built with composite materials which Boeing claimes
reduces fuel use by 20% compared to the 767 (Hawk, 2005; Boeing).
Air Traffic Control Improvements have the potential to decrease congestion and
delays, and allow more efficient flight paths. Delays in air travel lead to wasted fuel
and wages, as well as mis-allocated capital. According to Robyn (2007) while con-
gestion can result from weather delays, much is the result of a lack of capacity in
ATC infrastructure. In order to address the lack of capacity and increase operational
efficiency, the Federal Aviation Administration has begun a large, long-term systems
upgrade program, collectively named NextGen (JPDO, 2007). These technologies
include GPS-aided navigation, autonomous flight path coordination, digital commu-
nication between aircraft and ground-based navigation systems, improved awareness
and handling of weather data, and automation of many ATC operations (JPDO,
2007). Proposed NextGen systems have significant potential to increase system-wide
capacity, safety, and efficiency, including early tests which demonstrate the feasibility
of airspace capacities three times the current level (Prevot et al., 2010). However the
GAO (2010) states that quantifying the potential system benefits is difficult, as the
FAA has yet to define specific goals or capabilities for long-term expansion efforts,
let alone develop and test technologies.
2.4 Climate Change and Social Costs
The costs of climate change are large, global, and irreversible. Furthermore, due to
the timescale and uncertainty over which climate damages will occur, comparison
between the costs of climate outcomes, and the large, relatively near-term and cer-
tain costs of GHG mitigation is likely to produce results subject to intense political
and academic scrutiny. The best-known example of a comprehensive, long-term cost-
benefit analysis was presented in the 2007 report, "The Economics of Climate Change
- The Stern Review." The Stern Review found that while marked by uncertainty, the
costs of climate change outweigh the costs of mitigation (Stern, 2006). But dubi-
ous assumptions are necessary to come to this conclusion: rates of time-preference
must be applied across multiple generations, calling the validity of a policy maker's
agency into question, and uncertainty about climate impacts is compounded when
considering the economic impacts of those future changes. Despite the ongoing debate
over the outcomes and relevance of cost-benefit analyses of climate change mitiga-
tion (Weitzman, 2007; Yohe and Tol, 2007; Nordhaus, 2009), I proceed with a cost
minimization analysis which seeks to reduce emissions on a lowest-cost basis while
meeting some mitigation goal.
2.5 Policy Theory: Command & Control vs. Market-
Based Instruments
Controlling an externality on a society-wide level can typically take one of two forms,
both provided by a strong government actor: direct 'command and control' regulation,
or market-based instruments designed to internalize the social cost of an externality.
Economists concerned with maximizing social welfare typically prefer the latter for
the economic efficiency gained, while through the political process, the former is often
the result.
Emissions of Carbon Dioxide and Oxides of Nitrogen, as well as contrail cloud
formation are economic externalities produced by aviation. Economic theory predicts
that the lack of a price signal will lead to an over-production of the social "bad;"
climate change (Hardin, 1968).The mechanism by which the overproduction of an
economic externality may occur has become widely recognized as the main problem of
environmental regulation. Society's inability to autonomously recognize and respond
to the threat of climate change, and to therefore to act in its own rational self interest,
belongs to a special class of market failures called collective action problems, discussed
by Olson (1974). In a collective action problem, the greatest transaction cost comes
from the potential for free-ridership, or an individual's incentive to "pretend to have
less interest in a given collective consumption activity than he really has" (Samuelson,
1954). Samuelson claims that if a consumption good is not rivalrous, consumers
will elect to pay less than the marginal cost of production. Market-based policy
instruments seek to harness the equilibrating forces of supply and demand to resolve
collective action problems. By assigning a real price to an economic externality,
governments may internalize the marginal social cost, leading to an efficient allocation
of consumption away from the social "bad."
By contrast, command & control policies include any policy which seeks to di-
rectly restrict the production of a social externality. Examples of such regulations
include Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards for automobiles, en-
ergy efficiency and labeling standards for appliances (Energy Star), and quotas for
minimum production of renewable fuels (Renewable Fuel Standard). But due to the
global scale of the problem of climate change, targeted emissions reductions policies
like these are likely to miss the lowest-cost marginal emissions reduction. A price
on emissions would be the most efficient regulation, leaving the decision on how to
minimize costs up to the most informed actor.
With the price of emissions internalized, the market mechanism can balance supply
of and demand for emissions, and achieve a socially optimal outcome, but only if the
price reflects the true social cost of emissions. While some attempts have been made
to calculate a marginal social cost of GHG emissions (Group, 2010; Yohe et al., 2007),
uncertainty is wide because costs hinge not only on uncertain physical parameters of
climate outcomes and uncertain effects of climate damages on human welfare, but
also on disagreements on how to value future damages in present terms.
Rather than formulating a marginal social cost of carbon, it is possible to restrict
emissions to a certain level and allow a price to form endogenously by selling the right
to emit. Given an idealized representation of the economy, quantity-based, or "cap
and trade" policies can be shown to result in equivalent outcomes as a strictly price-
based policy such as a carbon tax (Aldy et al., 2009). In practice, however, there can
be significant differences between these types of policies including how each policy
changes incentives as economic conditions change (Stavins and Whitehead, 1992).
2.6 European Union Emissions Trading System
The ETS is a pan-European Union policy which covers all large, stationary-source
emitters, and requires permits for every ton emitted. Prior to inclusion of aviation, the
policy regulates approximately 46% of EU CO2 emissions (Wagner, 2004).The ETS is
currently in its second phase which began on January 1, 2008 and will close in 2012.
Within each phase, permits are tradable, and both banking (holding permits for use
later) and borrowing (using permits from future allocations) are allowed (Ellerman
and Joskow, 2008).
In 2008, the European Commission approved the inclusion of aviation emissions
into the ETS, starting in 2012 (European Commission, 2008). The approved sectoral
reductions are 97% below 2004-2006 emissions by 2012, and 95% below for 2013.
The 2008 directive does not establish emissions quotas past 2013, but the recently
release white paper on European Transportation seeks to reduce transportation sector
emissions by 60% below 1990 levels by 2050 (European Commission, 2007, 2011).
The European Commission has not clarified what reduction targets it expects for the
aviation sector.
2.7 The Costs of Policy
Domestically, analysis of an economy-wide cap-and-trade policy similar to the "Waxman-
Markey" bill (H.R. 2454, 1 1 1 th congress)-a policy which would have reduced total
national emissions to 68-87%3 of 2005 levels by 2050- using the MIT Emissions
Prediction and Policy Analysis (EPPA) model found that the policy would decrease
welfare by 0.8% to 1.45% in 2050 compared to the baselinePaltsev et al. (2009b).
Because it is a domestic policy, the emissions reductions in the Waxman-Markey bill
cannot be extrapolated into a global GHG stabilization level, but the IPCC Fourth
Assessment Report states that policies which result in a 535-590 ppm C02-eq stabi-
lization level are projected to cost 1.3% of GDP on average (IPCC, 2007).
3This range of reductions differs from the explicit policy goal of 17% of 2005 levels by 2050
because it does not count offsets as emissions reductions within the U.S. If offsets result in actual
emissions reductions elsewhere in the world, the total emissions reductions as a result of the policy
will be equivalent to the policy goal.
2.8 Aviation-Sector Policy Proposals
Proposals from airlines and industry associations have consistently sided against avia-
tion's inclusion in economy-wide cap and trade policies. The U.S.-based Air Transport
Association (ATA) and the China Air Transport Association have both opposed in-
ternational flights' inclusion into the EU ETS (GreenAir, 2010; Cantle, 2011), and
the ATA opposed aviation's inclusion in the 'Waxman-Markey' climate legislation
in 2009 (May, 2009a,b). The IATA objects to aviation's inclusion in national cli-
mate policies as it sees the potential for a "patchwork" of national and trans-national
climate regimes, and anticipates anti-competitive outcomes that prefer particular air-
lines based on their nationality, or double-counting of some emissions due to incon-
sistent international coordination (IATA, 2009). Instead, the IATA supports a global
aviation-sector cap that limits aviation emissions to 2020 levels, and allow trading of
emissions permits among all airlines from every region. Regardless of the efficacy or
efficiency of such a policy, given the current state of international climate negotiations
the approach is of questionable feasibility. Furthermore while under an economy-wide
cap the efficient level of sectoral emissions would be determined endogenously, a sec-
toral cap opens the possibility of over- or under-estimation of the efficient level for
the cap. If permits are auctioned, and if trading is allowed between the aviation sec-
tor and the economy-wide cap, then estimation of the sectoral cap is not a problem.
If, however allocations are free, a separate sectoral cap which commits aviation to
carbon-neutral free growth after 2020 will cost airlines the potential rents from free
allocations.
Domestically, the ATA (2010) has identified a set of policy recommendations in
its publication, 21st Century Aviation - A Commitment to Technology, Energy and
Climate Solutions. The ATA endorses the IATA goal of a global-sectoral emissions
cap at 2020 levels, and likewise argues against domestic regulation. In opposition
to aviation's inclusion in a domestic cap-and-trade policy, the ATA reasons that the
recent rise in fuel costs provides sufficient incentive for airlines to mitigate emissions,
and that further price increases would lead to decreased efficiency. There is some
evidence to support the proposition by the ATA that increased fuel prices through
climate policy would have a detrimental effect on fleet-wide fuel efficiency. In a
previous study coupling the EPPA model with an aviation-specific partial equilibrium
model, Winchester et al. (2011) find that under an economy-wide cap, declines in
demand due to increased price and decreased income result in decreased investment
in new aircraft and slower fleet turnover, which in turn results in worse fleet-average
fuel efficiency compared to the baseline. Winchester et al. (2011) found that the
policy-induced decline in efficiency ranged from 0.5% to 2.3% in 2050. However, while
decreased efficiency may be considered suboptimal all else being equal, the objective
of a cross-sectoral policy-to mitigate climate damages at the lowest social cost-
may still be met by reducing emissions elsewhere in the economy, even if efficiency
decreases in other sectors.
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Chapter 3
Methodology
3.1 EPPA Background
The MIT Emissions Prediction and Policy Analysis (EPPA) model is a recursive-
dynamic computable general equilibrium model that describes the global economy
in 16 regions and with 15 economic sectors. EPPA for Aviation, or EPPA-A is a
modified version of the fifth implementation of EPPA which adds the 15th sector:
Air T ransportation, highlighted in Table 3.1.
The most recent documentation available is for EPPA4, but the main structure of
EPPA-A is unchanged from Paltsev et al. (2005). Changes in EPPA5 are primarily
a change in the underlying data from the GTAP5 to GTAP7 data set (bringing the
base year from 1997 to 2004), and the disaggregation of the agricultural sector in to
crops, livestock and forestry. Labor force and productivity growth are also updated
from the EPPA4 model according to the assumptions made in Paltsev et al. (2009a).
EPPA describes the economy in terms of nested Constant Elasticity of Substi-
tution (CES) functions that relate the structure of inputs to both cost functions of
producers and to the demand functions of consumers. EPPA-A adds a CES produc-
tion structure for aviation, and alters the production of household transportation to
include the new input.
EPPA-A Regions EPPA-A Sectors
USA
CAN
MEX
JPN
ANZ
EUR
ROE
RUS
ASI
CHN
IND
BRA
AFR
MES
LAM
REA
United States
Canada
Mexico
Japan
Australia - New Zealand
Europe
Eastern Europe
Russia Plus
East Asia
China
India
Brazil
Africa
Middle East
Latin America
Rest of Asia
CROP
LIVE
FORS
FOOD
COAL
OIL
ROIL
GAS
ELEC
EINT
OTHR
SERV
TRAN
CGD
AIRT
HTRN
Table 3.1: EPPA-A Regions and Sectors
Production Structure
Production in EPPA-A closely follows production in the standard EPPA model.
At the lowest level, all primary energy goods are aggregated into a primary energy
input. This is nested with electricity to form a composite energy good. Energy is
substitutable with the value-added nest which consists of capital and labor. The
aggregate energy-value added nest is combined with other intermediate inputs which
enter into the top-level Leontief nest. Intermediate goods can be composed of do-
mestic or composite import goods, where the composite imports consist of a nest of
imports from all other regions. EPPA-A's aviation production structure is displayed
in Figure 3-1.
Agriculture - crops
Agriculture - livestock
Agriculture - forestry
Food products
Coal
Crude Oil
Refined Oil
Gas
Electricity
Energy-intensive Industries
Other Industries
Services
Transport
Savings Good
Air Transport
Household Transportation
EPPA-A Regions EPPA-A Sectors
Domestic Production
CROP FORS LIVE
Domestic Imports
Regions, R
FOOD
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ELEC ENOE Capital Labor
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Figure 3-1: EPPA-A Production Structure for Aviation Sector
Consumption Structure
Like production, consumption in EPPA-A mirrors that of the standard EPPA
model, except for the addition of Air Transport. At its lowest level, consumption
is split between a composite energy good (that does not take account of the differ-
ence between electricity and primary energy), and non-energy goods. Non-energy
goods include all non-transport, non-energy related goods. This composite "other
consumption" enters into the consumption nest with the composite transportation
nest to form "total consumption." Total consumption is substitutable for savings at
the top of the nest.
The composite transportation good consists of purchased transport and owned-
transport. Purchased transport is a composite of air transportation and other trans-
portation, whereas owned-transport represents privately-owned cars and consists of
an energy input (refined oil) combined with a nest that includes inputs from the
"services" and "other" sectors. Consumption EPPA-A is displayed in Figure 3-2.
Consumer Utility
Total Consumption Savings
Other Consumption HTRN
Other Consumption Non-Energy PurchasedTransportation Own-Transport
ROIL GAS COAL ELEC AIRT TRAN
ROIL
Domestic Imports SERV OTHR
CROP FORS LIVE FOOD EINT OTHR SERV / /
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Figure 3-2: EPPA-A Consumption Nest
3.2 Calibration Data
Equilibrium and Data
Although the balanced GTAP7 database is essential for an equilibrium model, the
process of balancing data undoubtedly results in noise at granular levels (for more
information see the GTAP 7 documentation, Narayanan G. and Walmsley (2008)).
In the case of civil air transport in the U.S., the GTAP7 data reports a total sectoral
output of $182.6 Billion. While GTAP 7 uses 2004 for the base year, the data for
the U.S. is sourced from the 2002 U.S. input-output tables provided by the Bureau of
Economic Analysis, and scaled forward to 2004. The 2002 input-output tables report
a sectoral output of $102.4 Billion, a difference of almost 80% in two years (BEA,
2008). To confirm the discrepancy, data from the Air Carrier Statistics database
(form 41 data) is presented below in Table 3.2 for both 2002 and 2004 (U.S. Bureau
of Transportation Statistics, a).
In order to give a more accurate picture of the U.S. aviation sector, the GTAP7
database is rebalanced according to the air transport sector output given by the 2004
Air Carrier Statistics form 41 data.
Disaggregation of sector
The first step to re-balancing the GTAP data is to aggregate it into EPPA re-
gions and sectors. Whereas air transport exists as a standalone sector in the GTAP 7
data set, the default EPPA aggregation scheme combines aviation into the transport
(TRAN) sector. The difficulties presented in disaggregation of aviation from other
transportation are minimal. GTAP includes separate accounting of air transporta-
tion (atp), water transportation (wtp), and all other transportation (otp). In the
standard EPPA model, these three GTAP sectors exist as one EPPA sector, TRAN.
A standalone air transport (AIRT) sector is created by removing atp from TRAN
and assigning it to AIRT.
Sector Calibration
The preliminary step of creating an air transport sector complete, the benchmark
economic data must be balanced with a new starting value for aviation output. In
addition to adjustments to total output, a share of aviation is shifted from intermedi-
ate demand by the services (SERV) sector toward final demand. The BEA Use table
indicates that almost 70% of domestic aviation consumption is final demand, whereas
GTAP allocates the lion's share to SERV.
To re-balance the model after making the above changes, a non-linear program-
ming approach is used. The Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) which contains the
base-year data must meet the conditions set forth above. In addition, there are
region-specific conditions which must be met. A 'least-squares' objective is mini-
mized according to Equation 3.1
Source Output ($Billion) Year
BEA Input-Output Use Table 102.4 2002
Air Carrier Statistics Database 107.1 2002
Air Carrier Statistics Database 134.7 2004
GTAP7 182.6 2004
Table 3.2: Benchmark Sector Output and Sources
lsqobj = {xo( - 1)2] (3.1)
Where x is the set of parameters in the benchmark data, with an initial value x0,
and a variable value x. Lsqobj is minimized while satisfying the balancing conditions.
The full matrix re-balancing code can be found in Appendix A.
3.3 Elasticity Parameter Estimates
3.3.1 Income Elasticity of Demand
Though the income elasticity of demand for air transport, r/A is important for fore-
casts of aviation demand growth, the existing EPPA framework does not allow an
easy augmentation of income elasticities other than 1. This is because EPPA makes
use of constant elasticity of substitution production and consumption functions with
constant returns to scale that imply an income elasticity of demand equal to one.
Using the time evolution of EPPA to augment growth allows exogenous forcing of a
non-unity 7/A.
Sources of Estimation
A large meta-study of aviation demand related elasticities was conducted by the
transport and tourism consulting firm InterVISTAS (2007), which concludes "vir-
tually all [the] studies estimated income elasticities above one, generally between
+1 and +2." Jost (2010) provides an analysis of these studies and the applicability
of their results for modeling, and finds that 1.4 is an appropriate world-wide pa-
rameter. In order to apply these results to EPPA-A, however, conclusions must be
drawn about different markets, both those mature and growing. In the 2008 Travel
and Tourism Competitiveness Report from the World Economic Forum, Blanke and
Chiesa (2008) find that income elasticity is highest for developing countries, and de-
clines as incomes increase and markets mature. They provide another reading of the
InterVISTAS study which gives ranges of income elasticity across route and economy
types. For the baseline rqA, 1.4 is chosen.
Method of Implementation
The CES functional form gives outputs that grow in income at a rate of unity.
Increased growth based on a non-unity income elasticity of demand in total consump-
tion, 7?A, requires modifications to the demand function. Following Fullerton (1989),
one approach is to add a displacement term, b, to the factor input in the CES func-
tion, and tune the displacement term such that changes in income are met by changes
in demand for air transportation, AT, according to 77A. Using the CES nest for con-
sumption of purchased transportation from Figure 3-2, PURTRN is a composite of
AT and other purchased transportation, OT. The total amount of PURTRN is cal-
culated from the inputs AT and OT, the share parameters, aAT and aoT, and the
substitution elasticity, o-.:
PURTRN = [aT (AT + b) + a| OT aT (3.2)
In the base year, it is possible to solve for b as a function of total output of air
transport; AT, total income; I, the income elasticity of demand; qA, and disposable
income, ID (ID I - pATb). The solution provided by Fullerton (1989) yields:
b = AT(1 -J) (3.3)
This approach allows for endogenous adjustments to consumption of a good based
on non-unity income elasticity, but only given a unity pricing assumption. If prices
are not benchmarked to 1, the solution does not hold, and price effects dominate. I
adapt the method for use in a dynamic model by adding a displacement term to the
share parameter, aAT, instead of the input AT. Adjustments are made to the share
parameter following each period rather than endogenously. While using the dynamic
process does not allow for intra-period income changes, the inter-period changes to
income (driven by growth in labor force and productivity) dominate the intra-period
changes. Thus, PURTRN is formulated as follows:
P RR1 1
PURTRN = [ao 4 AT-- + aaTOT -] 3- (3.4)
And rather than adding the displacement coefficient b to the factor input, it is
added to the input share parameters aAT and aoT. Both share parameters must
be re-normalized according to the displacement, and are functions of initial-period
consumption of air transportation ATo, other purchased transportation, OTo, and the
displacement term, b:
AT+b O To
aA=ATo+T 0 b aoT A TO b (3.5)ar ATO + OTO + b, o ATo + OTo + b(35
Assuming the elasticity of substitution, o-, is approximately one, the change in
demand for air transportation due to the displacement is approximately equal to the
displacement:
b ~ AAT (3.6)
The definition of income elasticity, 7A is as follows:
I IOAT (37)
?A= YAT
Recognizing that 1A is composed of endogenous income growth at a rate of unity,
and an additional rate which is forced exogenously, qA can be decomposed into ?7 A,E
and 1. Likewise, change in demand can be decomposed into change due to endogenous
growth, AATe, and change in demand due to input share displacement, b, it is possible
to back-solve for displacement:
b = TA (7A,E + 1) - A ATe (3.3)A~I
Which reduces to:
AT AIb= ?7A,E (3.9)
This expression leaves the displacement as a function of total consumption, change
in total consumption, and demand for air transportation, all of which are readily
available within the model.
3.3.2 Substitution Elasticities
The majority of substitution elasticities in EPPA-A are unchanged from the EPPA
5 model (Paltsev et al., 2005). This includes the elasticities in the cost function for
production of aviation, with the exception of the elasticity of substitution between
energy and the value-added nest, 0 E,KL, which has the most direct effect on the
rate of endogenous technical efficiency improvement available to the aviation sector.
Unlike AEEI, endogenous efficiency is the result of price signals influencing change in
the production structure. The vast majority of aviation-sector energy use (>98%) is
refined oil consumed by aircraft. Because of the technical homogeneity of the sector,
and the relatively long life of planes in the fleet, this elasticity is likely to be low,
but it is also difficult to directly measure. Historical rates of total energy efficiency
improvement in the aviation sector provide one potential source of calibration. There
are several published estimates, and it is possible to adjust 1 E,KL so that the BAU
total energy efficiency improvement rate aligns with these estimates (Lee et al., 2001;
Penner et al., 1999). Nest elasticities are given in Table 3.3.
Production Consumption
O'D,M 3.0 OCs 0.0
0 M,M 5.0 UC,T 0.5
0 E,KL 0.1 apo 0.4
OVA 1.0 0 A,O varies
0 E,NOE 0-0
OEN 0.0
Table 3.3: Nest Elasticities for Aviation
3.3.3 Own-Price Elasticity of Demand
Like the income elasticity of demand, EPPA does not explicitly use an own-price
elasticity of demand for each sector. Instead, the own-price elasticity is expressed as
a function of the value shares (in total cost) and elasticities of substitution in the
intervening consumption nests. Whereas the own-price elasticity of demand can be
straightforwardly estimated econometrically, substitution elasticities are specific to
Market Segment Min Mean Max
Long-Haul International Business -0.475 -0.265 -0.198
Long-Haul International Leisure -1.7 -1.04 -0.56
Long-Haul Domestic Business -1.428 -1.15 -0.836
Long-Haul Domestic Leisure -1.228 -1.104 -0.787
Short-Haul Business -0.783 -0.7 -0.595
Short-Haul Leisure -1.743 -1.52 -1.288
Table 3.4: Own-Price Elasticities from Gillen et al. (2003)
individual models, and directly applicable estimates are rare. Therefore, substitution
elasticities are determined based on econometrically measured own-price elasticities
and value shares from the benchmark data.
There is a large base of literature estimating the own-price elasticity of demand
for aviation econometrically, including two recent and comprehensive meta-studies.
Gillen et al. (2003) compile 21 unique econometric studies of the own-price elasticity
of demand for air transportation, rank them, and synthesize the parameters, applying
three dichotomies, resulting in six categories they find essential for the description of
air transport markets. These markets are defined by the distinctions between: Short
Haul vs. Long Haul, International vs. Domestic, and Leisure vs. Business travel.
Results from Gillen et. al. are summarized in Table 3.4.
In EPPA-A these market distinctions are not used. Instead a single aggregate own-
price elasticity of demand is used to calculate the elasticity of substitution. Across
all market distinctions, the price elasticity of demand is shown to be negative, and
the average elasticity across all markets is -0.96, which is rounded up to -1.
Application of Own-Price Elasticity of Demand
In EPPA-A, aviation is directly substitutable with other purchased transportation.
This sector includes all transportation goods which are not air transportation, or
road transportation using self-owned vehicles. The elasticity of substitution between
air transport and other purchased transport can be adjusted so that the own-price
elasticity of demand for aviation matches the estimate. According to Tyers and Yang,
the own-price elasticity of demand, 'rA,A can be expressed in terms of these parameters
EPPA Region aA,o
USA 1.27
CAN 1.33
MEX 1.07
JPN 1.10
ANZ 1.43
EUR 1.23
ROE 1.05
RUS 1.11
ASI 1.26
CHN 1.05
IND 1.04
BRA 1.16
AFR 1.15
MES 1.16
LAM 1.12
REA 1.16
Table 3.5: Elasticity of Substitution by region
according to the following formula, where 9i is the share of sector (or aggregate good)
i in total consumption, and o-j is the elasticity of substitution between sectors i and
j (Tyers and Yang, 2000).
77A,A = -A[crA,0(OA'-0 1) Oo,T(OO 1 )+T,C(~ 1 ~-O 91)-+|-C,S(Ool-1)] (3.10)
In order to implement an own-price elasticity of demand consistent with the lit-
erature estimates, the elasticity of substitution between air transport and other pur-
chased transportation, aA,o is adjusted. Because share parameters vary across re-
gions, so too must cA,o take region-specific values. These are reported in Table 3.5.
3.4 Other Model Features
Autonomous Energy Efficiency Improvement
Autonomous energy efficiency improvement is applied to most sectors of the econ-
omy based on an exogenous parameterization of the historical changes in non-price
induced declines in the share of energy in consumption. The need for this factor arises
from econometric data which shows that over time economies become more efficient
at a rate greater than that which can be explained by prices, and is often ascribed
to non-price induced technological change. In EPPA-A, rates of autonomous energy
efficiency improvement are based on those in EPPA4, and are varied across regions,
with developed economies and China seeing the highest rates of improvement, and
developing economies lagging behind (Webster et al., 2008; Kaufmann, 2004; Paltsev
et al., 2005). Due to the small number of commercial aircraft manufacturers, aviation
is assigned a rate that is constant across all regions and consistent with developed
economies.
In the aviation sector, higher annual rates of fuel efficiency improvement have
been assumed (1.4% by the IPCC (Penner et al., 1999), 1.2-2.2% by Lee, et. al.
(Lee et al., 2001)). However, these studies have estimated rates of potential technical
change given past prices. Since fuel costs are a significant portion of airlines' cost
structures, there is likely to be additional price-induced technical change.
Biofuels
EPPA-A includes sectors for the production of 2nd generation biofuels based on
the incremental costs of cellulosic ethanol. The sector produces a substitute for refined
oil products, but is disallowed for use in aviation.
Emissions and Fuel Use
EPPA tracks fuel use in physical units according to the method in Paltsev et al.
(2005), which allows direct calculation of a sector's physical carbon emissions based
on the carbon content of the fuel used. CO 2 emissions are calculated from the carbon
content of each type of fuel. While aviation emissions of non-CO 2 greenhouse gases are
negligible, under the cap, trading between gases is allowed according to the 100-year
global warming potentials (GWP) in Table 3.6.
Species GWP
CO2  1.00
CH4  5.72
N2 0 84.47
PFC 1,771.12
SF6  6,512.26
HFC 354.22
Table 3.6: 100-year Global Warming Potential
EPPA-A also calculates and reports emissions of urban gases including carbon
monoxide (CO), non-methane volatile organic compounds (VOCs), nitrogen oxides
(NO,), sulfur dioxide (SO2), and black and organic carbon (BC, OC). These gases
evolve according to trends described in Paltsev et al. (2005). Base-year aviation
emissions of criteria pollutants are disaggregated from the totals in the TRAN sector
according to their fraction in the Emission Database for Global Atmospheric Research
(EDGAR) 3.2FT2000 database (Olivier et al., 2005).
3.5 Alternative Aviation- Specific Modules
3.5.1 Air Traffic Control Improvements Module
In order to highlight the potential emissions reductions possible from future efficiency
gains in the national air traffic control (ATC) system, an additional module is intro-
duced. New ATC infrastructure is represented as a perfect substitute for the portion
of the production nest which represents flight operations. The availability of ATC
goods are limited by the production of "ATC Services" by the government for each
period, which itself is equal to the cumulative amount of advanced ATC taxes col-
lected in the previous periods, times a markup. The scale of production is not driven
by relative prices, but fixed so that the total amount of cumulative ATC tax revenue,
and only as much, is converted into ATC services. The taxes begin in 2015 and carry
through to either 2025 or 2035, with subsequent taxes equal to the benchmark de-
preciation rate. Cumulative revenue determines the scale of ATC output and is also
subject to depreciation at the benchmark rate of 5%. Figure 3-3 shows the modified
air transport production structure.
While published estimates vary widely, the tax rate and markup are tuned to
reflect an amount of ATC services possible from the FAA's NextGen capital program.
This structure offers several advantages, but is different from the typical EPPA-A
production function. First, it reflects the real-world relationship between the provision
and consumption of ATC services. In the U.S., ATC services are a good provided
by the government to the airline free of charge, while the cost of the service is paid
by taxes on the consumption of air transportation. Passenger taxes are ad-valorem,
with a rate set by law, so the revenue depends on the quantity of air traffic control
consumed, but the tax also increases the price of consumption. The choice to tax or
not to tax is not a market decision, nor is the rate optimized for efficiency. In the
standard EPPA-A model, passenger taxes are included in the benchmark tax rate, and
the provision of ATC services is included in government consumption, and implicitly
provides the same level of service throughout the model horizon; capacity is implicitly
constant. With the addition of the ATC module, additional taxes are applied in order
to improve performance above the baseline. The markup reflects the expected returns
from real-world investments of this type, but due to a lack of certainty in the specific
technologies to be employed in the NextGen build-out, compounded by uncertainty
with respect to the potential costs of and savings available from these technologies,
a large range is unavoidable. Markups are therefore estimated according to high,
middle and low estimates for system efficacy. These estimates reflect the highest and
lowest literature values found, or, as in the case of "percent of delays mitigated"
where only one literature estimate was found, simply represent a large range around
the center. Assumptions are made about the costs of delays to airlines in wasted fuel,
labor and capital assignments, about the per-period costs of the NextGen system and
about the ability of new technologies to reduce delays.
Domestlc Production
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Figure 3-3: Advanced ATC in Production of Air Transport
Costs of Delays
The total economic costs of airline delays includes costs to airlines of wasted re-
sources, costs to passengers of wasted time and loss in demand for aviation. Costs
to airlines stem from wasted fuel and additional wages paid to staff as well as unnec-
essary capital use. These inputs to production are explicitly modeled in EPPA-A's
energy-value-added nest, and are therefore can be displaced by ATC services. Costs
to passengers, however, are not explicit inputs in EPPA-A, but reflect a cost to con-
sumers equivalent to the lost value of time. These loses rely on econometric estimates
of the value of time, and are not included in the estimates of potential savings to
airlines. Various studies have estimated the size of each of these costs differently.
In Ball et. al., the costs to airlines are found to account for roughly 30% of total
economic costs, or $8.3 Billion (Ball et al., 2010). By comparison, a study by the
Congressional Joint Economic Committee (JEC) finds double the cost ($19 Billion)
to airlines, whereas lost passenger time was proportionally less ($12 Billion) (Joint
Economic Committee, 2008). Both reports estimate costs in 2007, and are used as
upper and lower bounds, with their average as the central estimate, for the costs to
airlines of delays. To estimate the total cost of delays to airlines, the dollar cost in
2007 is normalized to the base year (2004) by the total average delay rate (from the
U.S. Bureau of Transportation Statistics (b)) and operating expenses in 2007 (from
Swelbar and Belobaba) as a percentage of total expenses, and is presented in Table
3.7 (U.S. Bureau of Transportation Statistics, b; Swelbar and Belobaba). As men-
tioned above, this method assumes a constant percentage of flights delayed in future
periods.1
Estimates of the Cost of NextGen Programs
While some NextGen programs are well-defined, others are less certain, partic-
ularly in the long-term where project capabilities are still being discussed. While
near-term expenditures are focused on research and development, the model should
reflect the costs of service provision. For estimates of program cost, the most recent
estimates for both cost and program horizon from the Government Accountability
Office are used. The costs of NextGen program implementation include government
expenditures as well as airline capital upgrades. Because the equipage upgrades for
airlines are required, providing for their cost with a ticket tax is identical to the
airlines passing the costs through in the aviation price. Therefore, the government
and airline capital costs are aggregated into a single program cost. The Government
Accountability Office highlights the Joint Planning Development Office's (JPDO) es-
timate that the highest level of program performance could cost the FAA and airlines
together over $160 Billion if implemented by the program horizon of 2025, while not-
ing the costs could come down if the project horizon were extended to 2035 (GAO,
2010). This is a significant increase over previous JPDO cost estimates through 2025
of $29-$42 Billion, and it reflects the large uncertainties associated with the program's
goals and their costs (JPDO, 2007).
For the ATC module, the lower bound for program cost is $40 Billion through 2025,
and the upper bound is $160 Billion over the same period. The central estimate is
$80 Billion through 2025.
Estimates of Delay Reduction
'According to the U.S. Bureau of Transportation Statistics (b), the total delay rate in 2007
was 26%; the highest rate on record. In the EPPA-A base year (2004), the total delay rate was
21.3%, whereas the average delay rate over the record provided by BTS (2002-2011YTD) was 20.7%.
Therefore, the costs of delays as a percent of total operating costs in 2007 are adjusted by the lower
average delay rate in the model.
The goals of NextGen infrastructure investments are many, but capacity expansion
and delay reduction are instrumental toward decreasing airline costs. While it is
working toward tripling airspace density, the JPDO has not made clear what level
of delays will be acceptable under the NextGen system. Winchester et al. (2011),
who use 2015 as the introduction of incremental efficiency gains in the U.S., and
2025 as the date of full system availability, simulate delay reductions by decreasing
route distance across all flights by a fixed percentage. Instead, in EPPA-A, a fixed
percentage of delay costs are eliminated. Because delay costs are assumed to be a fixed
percentage of operating costs, the delay reduction is multiplied by the delay costs. For
the central estimate, EPPA-A uses a 50% reduction in delays (following the estimate
in Dray et al. (2010)). The reduction of fuel, capital and labor usage costs resulting
from the use of the central estimate approximately accords with the reduction of costs
which would result from the 10% reduction in distance in Winchester et al. (2011).
The upper and lower bounds are 90% and 10% respectively. A complete set of high,
low and central parameter estimates are included in Table 3.7.
High Central Low
Baseyear Costs of Delays ($Billion) 15.35 11.03 6.70
Cost of Delays (% of output) 11.78% 8.47% 5.14%
Total Cost of NextGen ($Billion) 40 80 160
Program Horizon 2025 2025 2025
Cost Per-Period ($Billion) 13.3 26.7 53.3
Percent Delay Reduction 90% 50% 10%
Markup in Base Year 1.03 0.21 0.01
Table 3.7: Advanced ATC Markup Estimates
Because EPPA-A relies on a zero-profits assumption, industry output is equivalent
to industry costs, and therefore, the savings to airlines in period t, SAt, are defined
by the industry output, AT, the cost of delays as a percent of output, %CD, and the
percent of delays mitigated by the ATC infrastructure %DR:
SAt = %DR x %CD x AT (3.11)
The markup MUt is the ratio of the savings to airlines to the exogenously-
determined per-period program cost estimates in Table 3.7, PCt:
MUt = - x %CD AT (3.12)PCt PCt
The program cost is also used to calculate a tax rate, rt, for each period based on
industry output:
PCtPe =(3.13)1t AT,
3.5.2 Business Management Variability
In addition to ATC improvements, potential fuel savings from management decisions
that can affect the production functions using vintage capital are explicitly modeled.
While the standard EPPA vintage production structure allows no substitutability
between any inputs (all nest elasticities, o=O)-, the business management modification
allows airlines some limited substitutability between the energy and value-added nests
(O-=0.1).
3.6 Sensitivity Analysis
All modeling comprehends some level of uncertainty. In economic modeling, it is
particularly important to identify the relevant parameter estimates which may have
the largest effect on model output. While previous studies of EPPA have explored the
topic further, it is useful to have a method of comparing the impact of uncertainty
around aviation parameters with that around other important EPPA parameters.
Tornado Diagrams
In order to assess the impact that different parameters will have on different
outcomes, Tornado Diagrams are generated. The particular parameters of interest
are those from EPPA which have been determined by Cossa to have the greatest effect
on model outputs, with the addition of the air transportation AEEI rate. EPPA
parameters are varied according to high and low values which were estimated to
represent two standard deviations' difference through expert elicitation (Cossa, 2004).
These parameters and their variations are listed in Table 3.8.
Parameter Low High
Vintage Share -33% +100%
Energy Nest Elasticity -25% +25%
AEEI Rate for All Sectors -30% +35%
AEEI Rate for Aviation -30% +60%
Labor Productivity -20% +20%
Aviation Income Elasticity of Demand -15% +15%
Table 3.8: Sensitivity Analysis Parameter Variation
The elasticity between energy and non-energy goods in production of agriculture
as referenced by Cossa (2004) is not the same as the elasticity between energy and the
value-added nest in air transportation, however the percentage range applied to the
parameter (i25%) can be used. Another aviation-specific parameter which merits
testing is the income elasticity of demand for aviation which ranges between 1.2 and
1.6 (1il5%).
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Policies Implemented in this Study
In order to evaluate the response of the aviation sector to policy constraints, several
policies are designed and compared to an unconstrained BAU case. In each carbon
policy, exogenous emissions targets are set as fractions of 2005 emissions, and are
applied in all Annex B regions from the Kyoto Protocol (UNFCCC, 1998). Addition-
ally, advanced Air Traffic Control is applied in the U.S., and the business management
model is applied in all regions. Table 4.1 summarizes the policies applied in this thesis.
Scenario Name Economy- Aviation Regions NotesWide Cap Sector Cap
Business As Usual
Economy-Wide Cap &
Trade
Aviation-Sector Cap
with Trading
Aviation-Sector Cap
without Trading
Advanced Air Traffic
Control
Business Management
BAU
POL
SECPOLT
SECPOL.YT
ATC
VMGMT
Table 4.1: Policies Implemented
All No emissions constraints in
any Region
Annex B Emissions constrained to 50%
of 2005 levels by 2050
Aviation emissions
unconstrained until 2020;
Annex B afterwards capped at 2020
levels. Aviation can purchase
permits from other sectors
Aviation emissions
unconstrained until 2020;
Annex B afterwards capped at 2020levels. Aviation cannot
purchase permits from other
sectors
Central, Low and High
U.S. parameter estimates; applied
to both BAU and POL
All Applied to both BAU and
POL
in this Thesis
4.1 Business as Usual
In the business as usual scenario, the model is run from the base year of 2004 to
2050 with no emissions caps. While "business as usual" can imply assumptions about
future policy decisions, in this case the BAU scenario is unconstrained by any existing
policies, including the EU ETS. Model evolution is driven by the model structure and
exogenous growth parameters, but limited by the fixed stock of land and fossil fuels.
4.2 Economy-Wide Cap & Trade Policy
Given the political uncertainty surrounding the state of greenhouse gas regulation
in the developed world, and particularly in the U.S., no attempt is made to model
any specific policy proposal. Instead, a generalized form of policies such as the EU
Emissions Trading Scheme and the proposed 'Waxman-Markey' bill is applied. The
POL scenario restricts the quantity of emissions of greenhouse gases according to
a specific schedule. The policy covers CO 2 and all Kyoto Accord gases, which are
tradable according to their 100-year global warming potentials (see Table 3.6). The
policy applies Kyoto Accord Annex B regions. In EPPA-A these regions are the US,
Canada, Russia, Japan, and the composite regions of Europe (including EU member
states as well as other European Community members) and Australia-New Zealand.
Reduction schedules in the sample policy scenario follow a linear path starting
with a cap of 95% of 2005 emissions in 2010, and reducing to 85% of 2005 emissions
in 2015, and reducing 5% per period (1% per year) thereafter. The policy reaches
a final cap of 50% of 2005 emissions by 2050. Because this is a hard cap with no
offsets or global trading allowed, the final emissions reduction achieved in the U.S.
is somewhat below the reductions achieved in the medium offsets case in an EPPA
assessment of H.R. 2454 (Paltsev et al., 2009b). The reduction path of the sample
policy compared to baseline in the U.S. is shown in Figure 4-1.
International trade is not regulated under the policy caps. While EPPA-A does not
allow perfect substitution for either imports for domestic goods, or among imports
from various regions, substitution is relatively elastic. While systems like the EU
ETS anticipate border adjustments for inbound aviation, it is not clear that this will
be the case for other national arrangements. In EPPA-A imports of aviation are
regulated under the emissions policy of their origin, and exports are regulated under
the domestic policy.
4.3 Sectoral Caps
Two sectoral caps are applied to EPPA-A: SECPOL_T, and SECPOLNT. In both
scenarios, the economy-wide cap is still enforced, but an additional aviation-sector-
only cap is applied to airlines. The first policy, SECPOLT, allows trading between
the aviation sector and other sectors under the economy-wide cap. SECPOL-NT does
not. Neither cap allows international trading, but both are applied in all Annex B
regions. Under the sectoral cap, aviation sector emissions are allowed BAU growth
until 2020. Afterwards emissions are capped at 2020 levels for all future periods.
The 'carbon-neutral' growth of the aviation sector is complemented by an economy-
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Figure 4-1: Sample Policy Emissions Reductions
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wide cap identical to the above scenario, except for the exclusion of aviation from
trading sectors. The quantity of aviation emissions is subtracted from the economy-
wide cap so that the total national emissions remain identical in each policy case:
POL, SECPOLT and SECPOLNT. The only difference between these three cases is
the allocation of emissions caps. Trading between gases is permitted in the economy-
wide cap, but because non-C02 GHG emissions from aviation are approximately zero,
there is no trading between gases in the sectoral cap. Under the sectoral cap with
trading, the aviation sector can purchase emissions permits from other sectors under
the economy-wide cap, but cannot sell aviation-cap emissions to other sectors of the
economy.
4.4 Alternative Emissions Reduction Scenarios
The rate of energy efficiency improvement has a large effect on the evolution of avia-
tion prices and sectoral growth. As the uncertainty analysis makes clear, changes in
the rate of autonomous technical change have a large impact on not only the growth
of the sector, but also on the sector's response to growing fuel prices. Further im-
provements in efficiency are available through endogenous substitution away from
energy goods in the aviation sector's production cost function. In reality, however
further non-market improvements are available due to technical improvements in air
traffic control performance. Because these are not determined by the aviation sector,
the BAU scenario does not explicitly account for NextGen systems except for their
ability to keep pace with capacity growth. The BAU case implies a constant rate of
delays across all periods.
The ATC case uses an alternative approach and models an explicit "Advanced
Air Traffic Control" sector which, in addition to AEEI and endogenous efficiency im-
provements, increases the efficiency of air transport production. While uncertainties
are large, the explicit accounting of advanced ATC technologies tests the importance
of the effect of non-market infrastructure on the aviation sector's response to climate
policy. The ATC case is applied as an add-on to both the BAU and POL cases, and
is tested with central, low and high markup estimates (see Table 3.7). The ATC
modification is only applied in the U.S.
Additionally, the model's handling of old airframes is adjusted to allow for a small
amount of endogenous substitution away from energy use in older aircraft. This
substitutability is meant to represent management variables which are not represented
explicitly by the existing production structure. The VMGMT case is applied to the
BAU and POL cases in all regions.
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Results
5.1 Business as Usual
EPPA-A yields a business as usual forecast for aviation growth through 2050. The
BAU growth path affects the costs of policy scenarios presented below and is therefore
discussed in some depth, and compared with similar aviation forecasts. EPPA-A's
BAU scenario presents a world with significantly greater amounts of aviation in 2050,
both globally and in the U.S. EPPA-A tracks both physical output of the various
economic sectors, and the relative prices of commodities. Because EPPA models the
economy with all quantities in dollar values, sectoral output is measured in dollars.
Sectoral output in 2050 at 2004 prices is $476 Billion in the U.S.; 3.66 times larger
than the base year, 2004. This amount represents real output, and is best understood
as a quantity of air transport services provided. Globally, growth is even more robust,
growing from a total global sectoral output at 2004 prices of $516 Billion to $2.87
Trillion in 2050; 5.56 times larger.
EPPA-A forecasts slower growth over the period 2010-2030 than does the latest
published FAA Aerospace Forecast (FAA, 2011). While the FAA forecasts an average
annual rate of 3.1% growth in Revenue Passenger Miles (RPMs) for domestic markets
over the period from 2010-2031, and an average annual growth rate among U.S. flag
international RPMs of 4.8%, EPPA-A shows an average annual growth of sector
output (including domestic operations, as well as international operations by U.S.
Global U.S.
Forecast 2010-2035 2006-2036 2010-2030 2010-2031
EPPA-A 3.4% ~ 2.6%
ICAO 4.8%
FAA ~ 3.6%
Table 5.1: EPPA-A growth rates compared to forecasts
carriers) of 2.6%. This compares to the aggregate average FAA forecast of 3.6%
growth from 2010 through 2031. The FAA assumes an average annual real Gross
Domestic Product growth rate of 2.7%, while EPPA-A assumes a lower average annual
GDP growth rate of 2.3% over the same period.
Globally, EPPA-A can be compared to the International Civil Aviation Organi-
zation (ICAO) Committee on Aviation and Environmental Protection's most recent
global traffic forecast from 2006 to 2036 (ICAO, 2008). The ICAO forecast pro-
vides, like the FAA, expected annual rates of traffic growth, but segmented into three
decadal periods. Also like the FAA, ICAO forecasts are more bullish than EPPA-
A, projecting an average annual global RPK growth rate between 2006 and 2036 of
4.8%, where EPPA-A forecasts a growth rate between 2010 and 2035 of 3.4%.' These
results are summarized in Table 5.1.
In addition to traffic forecasts, EPPA-A's BAU revenue forecast can be compared
to the Aviation Environmental Portfolio Management Tool for Economics (APMT-E)
results for BAU growth. While in the base year, output of aviation is equivalent to
revenue because all prices are normalized to 1, for future periods, EPPA-A output
must be multiplied by the normalized price of aviation. Where physical output is
AT, revenue is R, and the relative prices of aviation and utility are pA and pu, 2
'The average growth rate from 2005-2035 in EPPA-A is lower at 3.1%, as it includes the effects
of the financial crisis of 2008-9, while the CAEP/8 forecasts were published in 2008 and could not
have taken the demand shock into account. Therefore, the post-crisis growth from EPPA-A is used
for this comparison.
2 While the price of aviation relative to the price of utility in EPPA-A is not intended to be a
universally applicable measure of real-world aviation price changes, using the price of utility as the
numeraire for the relative price gives an expression of the change in price of aviation relative to all
other goods. In the context of comparisons with revenue projections from APMT-E, this expression
works particularly well, as price changes in APMT-E are driven by EPPA results for refined oil price
increases. Refined oil prices passed to APMT-E are likewise normalized by the price of utility.
respectively, revenue in period t is given by:
R = -- * AT (5.1)
Pu,t
Using the normalized price of aviation, Sectoral revenue in 2050 is $672 Billion,
and global aviation-sector revenue in 2050 is $3.42 Trillion.
APMT-E is a detailed partial-equilibrium model of the global aviation sector. The
model has been designed and built for the FAA Office of Environment and Energy by
MVA consultancy in their continuing work in evaluating environmental policy (MVA,
2009). Because APMT-E is a partial equilibrium model, certain parameters must be
determined exogenously. In order to correlate APMT-E's baseline results with those
from EPPA-A, standard EPPA growth assumptions are used, including real GDP
growth rate, and refined oil prices. APMT-E calculates consumer demand across
each route group from these parameters and operational cost functions (taking into
account the variety of available existing aircraft and new technologies). Additionally,
APMT-E uses the same income elasticity of demand for aviation as EPPA-A. APMT-
E calculates sector revenue based on the prices and demand for each route group.
In the APMT-E BAU case, U.S. demand (in revenue-ton kilometers, RTKs) grows
at an average annual higher than the output growth rate in EPPA-A over the period
from 2004-2050. EPPA-A also tracks industry revenue, which grows faster than out-
put (as price increases over time) and more quickly than does revenue in APMT-E
over the whole simulation period. If the post crisis rates are compared (2015-2050)
growth rates are more aligned. These rates are summarized in Table 5.2.
The APMT-E Global BAU model predicts an average annual RTK growth rate of
4.1% from 2006 to 2050. The comparable EPPA-A growth rate is lower at 3.2%. The
rate of revenue growth in APMT-E is 3.7%, also larger than the comparable EPPA-A
rate of 3.4%. Complete global BAU trends are displayed in Figure 5-1, U.S. results
are in Figure 5-2.
Global
2004-2050 2006-2050 2015-2050
EPPA-A
Sector Output
Revenue
APMT-E
RTK
Revenue
3.2%
3.4%
4.1%
3.7%
3.2%
3.7%
4.3%
4.0%
U.S.
2004-2050 2006-2050 2015-2050
2.6%
3.1%
2.6%
3.2%
Table 5.2: EPPA-A and APMT-E growth rates
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Figure 5-1: Baseline Results and CAEP/8 Forecasts
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Figure 5-2: Baseline Results and FAA Forecasts
5.2 Global Emissions
5.2.1 BAU Emissions
While annex B regions constitute a majority of global emissions in the base year, due
to slower growth combined by a quickly growing developing world they are projected
to make up only 26% of global emissions by 2050. The global, annex B and U.S.
GHG emissions of all Kyoto gases in C02-equivalents are shown in Figure 5-3.
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Figure 5-3: Global BAU Emissions
5.2.2 Policy-Constrained Emissions
By comparison, the POL case reduces emissions by 11.5% globally from the BAU
case, and by 61.3% in annex B regions. In the U.S. the policy reduces emissions by
63.5% as compared to the no-policy case. Policy-scenario emissions are reported in
Figure 5-4, and total change of U.S. and Global emissions compared to the baseline
is shown in Table 5.3.
Policy Emissions
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Figure 5-4: Global Emissions under Policy
2004
36657
18666
7032
2050
BAU Policy
97837
25306
10417
86578
9803
3798
Table 5.3: Emissions in MMT C02-eq
5.3 Price of Emissions
In the POL case, emissions permits are tradable across greenhouse gases according to
their global warming potential, so the carbon price really reflects a C02-equivalent
price. The evolution of the carbon price shows the relative cost of carbon abatement
across constrained regions. The price per ton of C02-eq emitted in the U.S. rises
from $53.51 in 2020 to $164.53 in 2050. Among the constrained regions this carbon
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Global
Annex B
U.S.
prices axe only lower in Russia, where the 2020 price of $21.67 grows to $107.53 in
2050. Near-term prices are higher than in the U.S. for most regions, but by 2050,
Canada faces the highest carbon prices with $327.38 per ton.
In addition to the economy-wide policy, a sectoral policy which caps aviation
emissions at 2020 levels is applied. Two results are compared, one where trading
between the aviation-sector cap and the rest of the economy is allowed, and one
where trading is not. Both sectoral policy cases result in a separate carbon price for
the aviation sector and for the rest of the economy. In the SECPOLT case, where
one-way permit purchases are allowed from the economy to the sector, the sectoral
price is only ever as high as the economy wide price. The sectoral price may be lower
than the economy-wide price, but if it goes above the economy-wide price, airlines
will purchase permits from the rest of the economy. In the SECPOL-NT case, the
aviation-sector is far more constrained for emissions reductions and sees a much higher
price than the trading case, 28% higher than the trading case in 2050. Aviation price
evolution is seen in Figure 5-5.
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Figure 5-5: U.S. Relative Price of Aviation under Various Policies
5.4 Aviation Sector Emissions
When the POL case is applied across the economy, emissions reductions mostly come
from non-aviation sectors of the economy. While economy-wide emissions are reduced
63.5% compared to the baseline in the U.S. in 2050, Aviation Sector emissions reduc-
tions are significantly less at only 19.5% compared to the baseline. Moreover, while
total economy-wide emissions in the U.S. are decreasing at the end of the simulation
at an average annual rate of 1.2% per year, aviation sector emissions are continuing to
grow at a rate of 3.6% in both the POL and SECPOLT cases. In the SECPOLNT
case, aviation emissions remain capped at 2020 levels throughout the simulation.
Figure 5-6 shows U.S. aviation sector emissions in the baseline and various policy
scenarios. Without viable alternative technologies, sectoral emissions continue to rise
after a near-term period of relatively carbon-neutral growth (2010-2025).
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Figure 5-6: U.S. Aviation Emissions under Various Policies
5.5 Aviation Sector Output
Without backstop technologies or access to biofuels, the aviation sector experiences a
significant price shock as the price of refined oil increases. Some adjustment to higher
fuel prices is possible as production shifts away from fuel in the E-KL nest. This is
evident over the period from the introduction of the policy (2010) until the rate of
emissions growth meets that of the BAU scenario (2025). During this period, output
continues to grow (average annual rate of 2.0%) while emissions do not (average
annual rate of 0.8%). This endogenous effect reflects the potential for new, more
efficient capital. After 2025, both BAU and POL scenario emissions grow at an
average annual rate of 1.8%. The near-term (2010-2025) reduction in emissions is
largely due to a combination of substitution away from fuel use in the cost function,
and by reduction in output. After 2025, emissions reductions from BAU are due
mainly to reduction in output, shown in Figure 5-7.
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Figure 5-7: U.S. Aviation-Sector Output at 2004 Prices under Various Policies
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5.6 Aviation Energy Efficiency
The average rate of efficiency growth in the aviation sector over in the BAU case is
1.275%. This rate is a composite of the autonomous energy efficiency improvement
rate of 1% and an average annual rate of endogenous technical and management
change of 0.275% per year. In the POL case and in the SECPOLT case this av-
erage rate is identical and slightly higher than in the BAU at 1.32% per year, even
though the periods when greater improvements are made are delayed by 10 years in
the SECPOL.T case. In the SECPOLNT case, despite a significant increase in car-
bon price compared to the SECPOLT and POL cases, the average energy efficiency
improvement rate is only 0.03% higher. The range of estimates is under the ATA
goal of sustained 1.5% per year improvements, but is in the range of estimates made
by Lee et al. (2001).
As the model demonstrates, while the goal of an increased energy efficiency im-
provement rate may be laudable, the costs must be taken in context of the preferences
of the economy as a whole. The rate of energy efficiency improvement is highly sensi-
tive to the elasticity of substitution between energy and the value-added nest, 0 E,KL-
Because 0 E,KL is very inelastic, then reductions in emissions in the aviation sector
must be met by reduced output. But because demand for aviation is high, higher
prices lead to emissions cuts elsewhere in the model, rather than reduced aviation
emissions.
Figure 5-8: U.S. Aviation-Sectoral Energy Efficiency under Various Policies
5.7 Petroleum Use
This pattern is observable in the model-wide consumption of Refined Oil (ROIL). In
the BAU scenario, scarce resources raise prices for ROIL across the board, but not
sufficiently high for biofuels to completely displace ROIL use in any sector. By 2050,
ROIL use is still increasing or holding steady in the largest-consuming sectors in the
BAU case. This is not the case under the POL cap, wherein other sectors' ROIL use
falls by 76% compared to the BAU case. Due to a lack of access to 'drop-in' biofuels,
the aviation sector is the only sector whose refined oil use continues to grow through
the model horizon. Figure 5-9 shows the response in the various cases.
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Figure 5-9: Refined Oil Use in the U.S. by Sector
5.8 Welfare Loss
While the welfare loss of the economy wide cap is significant-3.2% loss compared to
BAU by 2050-the various aviation policies have limited effect on overall welfare gain
or loss. Welfare is relatively insensitive to aviation policy optimality because of the
limited size of the sector. In the U.S. as well as globally, both the SECPOL-T and
SECPOL-NT cases are slightly less costly than the POL case in 2020. Table 5.4 shows
the welfare change vs. BAU for each policy run. By 2050, however, the SECPOL-NT
case is significantly more expensive in the U.S. than either of the policies that allow
trading, which is to be expected. The sectoral cap restricts mitigation opportunities.
Globally, the expected outcome would be similar, albeit proportionally smaller, as
the economic inefficiencies in Annex B regions are a much smaller part of the global
economy in 2050. But globally, the SECPOL.NT case results in a slight welfare
improvement versus the POL case. Interestingly, this difference in welfare is due to a
large shift in trade between constrained and unconstrained regions, a shift which also
leads to an accompanying increase in global emissions. When imports of aviation are
disabled, the POL case shows a slight welfare advantage over both the SECPOLT
and SECPOLNT cases.
U.S. Global
2020 2050 2020 2050
Policy -0.4248% -3.1974% -0.5167% -2.9140%
Sectoral Policy, Trading -0.4187% -3.1854% -0.5076% -2.9120%
Sectoral Policy, No Trading -0.4190% -3.4396% -0.5099% -2.9128%
Table 5.4: Welfare Loss
5.9 International Trade
Interestingly, regions which see welfare gains from the sectoral cap without trade are
those whose emissions under an economy-wide policy are not much larger than the
2020 cap, and who are in a position to engage in trade with regions with strong
growth but firm caps. For example under the economy-wide cap, both Russia and
the EU have slow growing aviation emissions, and therefore under the sectoral cap
with no trading, they face lower sectoral carbon prices relative to the U.S. (35% and
60% lower, respectively). Thus, if European and Russian airlines can serve domestic
markets in the U.S. while using domestic credits, their domestic economy exports
more than they would in the economy-wide cap, and welfare loss from the policy
decreases. Indeed, under the sectoral policy with no trade, imports of aviation are
77% higher in the U.S. than in the economy-wide policy.
5.10 Air Traffic Control Module
When the ATC module is enabled, the result is entirely dependent upon the param-
eter estimates chosen. The low-efficiency parameters result in minimal fuel efficiency
gains at a substantial cost, while the high-efficiency parameters result in just the op-
posite. Table 5.5 shows the significant difference in outcomes based on the parameters
assumed.
Change in Fuel Intensity
Welfare Change ($(EJ/$)
BAU POL BAU POL
High 0.752% 0.995% -57.5% -62.1%
Central 0.104% 0.248% -23.8% -25.1%
Low -0.563% -0.534% -3.2% -2.5%
Table 5.5: Advanced ATC: Changes in Energy Intensity and Welfare vs. No ATC
Except when the low parameter estimates are used, change in sectoral energy in-
tensity is largely driven by ATC technology. In both the central and high parameter
scenarios, model results conflict with reality. Given the assumption that BAU de-
lay rates remain constant at 21% of flights, an energy intensity reduction of greater
than 21% through delay mitigation seems unreasonable. Sectoral output and energy
intensity are shown in Figure 5-10.
The addition of advanced ATC to the model has significant effects on sectoral
emissions. While in the low parameter case, BAU emissions in 2050 are only 0.6%
lower than without advanced ATC, in the central parameter case, they fall 1.5%. The
high parameter case yields the unlikely result of a 3.3% drop in emissions. In the POL
case, emissions levels remain the same, but the reduction in energy intensity leads
to a drop in price (as production of aviation requires fewer emissions permits), and
demand recovers more quickly.
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Figure 5-10: Advanced ATC Output and Energy Intensity
In both the BAU and POL scenarios, demand for air transport suffers in the near
term when additional taxes are applied. Following the sunset of ATC taxes, however,
air transport demand recovers much more quickly in the POL scenario.
5.11 Business Management Module
By explicitly allowing substitutability away from energy and toward the value-added
nest in vintage production, the business management module reflects the ability of
airlines to alter their schedules and operations to optimize energy efficiency with
old capital. When applied, the module results in an increase in the average annual
efficiency improvement rate from 1.275% to 1.32% in the BAU scenario. In the pol-
w
icy scenario, the increase provided by the business management module is relatively
smaller as without it, the model has already pushed efficiency to a higher baseline.
The module increases average annual efficiency improvement rates from 1.32% to
1.35%.
5.12 Model Sensitivity to Parameter Estimates
Changes in aviation sector output, both globally and in the U.S. are compared to the
reference for each parameter's high and low state. The variations on each parame-
ter are found in Table 3.8, while Figure 5-11 shows the model's sensitivity to each
parameter.
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Figure 5-11: Variation in Model Output by Parameter
EPPA-A is highly sensitive to the income elasticity of demand for aviation, and
to the exogenous labor productivity growth rate, neither of which are unexpected.
Both parameters directly determine the period-on-period change in consumption. The
relative sensitivity of the U.S. sectoral output compared to global output to the AEEI
lesa
a eei
aeei
elas
thet
w
rate shows the degree to which the U.S. aviation sector is constrained by energy prices;
elsewhere in the world, growth dominates. Perhaps most surprising is how inelastic
the policy output is to changes in the elasticity of substitution between energy and
the value-added nest. As this elasticity directly affects endogenous energy efficiency
improvement rates, it would be expected to yield a higher variation in model output.
Chapter 6
Conclusions
While long-term results from EPPA-A are conditioned on an extended period of
steady, positive economic growth around the world, the picture they paint is clear;
To avoid the most serious impacts of climate change, wide-spread and large-scale
emissions reductions are necessary. Compared to the present, the developing world
will be the source of most future emissions, and must therefore be included in any
future mitigation efforts. And while aviation technologies must be improved like
all technologies, the policies which seek to improve technical performance must be
understood in the context of their wider economic implications. Likewise, the problem
of aviation sector emissions must be understood in the greater context of global
emissions.
Aviation emissions constitute 1.8% of global GHG emissions in the base-year of
2004. By 2050 in the BAU model, this has increased to only 2.3%, meaning that
while aviation's share of emissions is growing, non-aviation emissions are still growing
rapidly as well. Even in the policy cases where total emissions in annex B regions
are halved while aviation emissions in the same regions increase, aviation's share
of global emissions rises to only 2.6%-largely due to the developing world's rapid
growth. Among annex B regions, however, the share of aviation emissions in policy
constrained regions more than triples from 2.6% in 2004 to 8.0% in 2050, and from
3.3% in 2004 to 11.6% in 2050 in the U.S. Due to the relatively quick growth of
developing-world emissions, the significant reductions in the U.S. and other annex
Figure 6-1: Under the Sectoral Policy, Trading is Efficient, Unless Allocations are
Free
B regions have little impact on the primary policy goal of reduced global emissions.
Thus further reductions in aviation emissions in annex B countries are among the
most expensive and difficult emissions reductions available in 2050.
The IATA and ATA's commitments to sector-wide carbon mitigation are laudable,
but are, quite understandably, too focused on aviation. From a welfare perspective,
the difference between a sectoral policy and an economy-wide policy is negligible as
long as trading is available. Between these policies, sectoral output and the price
of aviation are equivalent in 2050, with the only difference occurring during the
near-term (2010-2020) when aviation emissions are not capped in the sectoral policy.
However, a separate aviation-only cap can have large distributive effects if permit
allocations are free. The cap proposed by the IATA will leave the sector short in
every scenario. In the sectoral cap with trading, the U.S. aviation sector will need to
purchase 33.3% of their permits from the economy-wide cap by 2050. If allocations
are free, this sectoral distribution will leave the sector significantly under-allocated,
and the cost of transfers will significantly increase the price of the policy.
The effects of trade on global welfare and emissions can be large. The IATA's
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goal of avoiding an uncompetitive patchwork of policies may be unachievable. If
the trend toward an international system of coordinated national policies contin-
ues along with airspace liberalization and international access to domestic markets,
the differing systems of border adjustments will become even more important. The
ETS's current system will require airlines to purchase permits for half the emissions
of extra-European flights that originate or arrive in Europe. If an upstream policy
like H.R. 2454 (which includes airport bunker fuels) becomes law in the U.S., transat-
lantic flights that buy fuel in the U.S. and fly to Europe will face double counting
of emissions. But aviation, unlike energy intensive manufacturing, is relatively easily
integrated into a system of border adjustments.
The efficacy of air traffic control improvements faces serious uncertainty. Without
a clear program plan, the costs and potential savings of future technologies are spec-
ulative. However, given the range of estimates used in the EPPA-A ATC module, it
is clear that as long as ATC improvements are funded through additional passenger
taxes, sectoral output will decrease compared to baseline. However the decline in
sector output is matched by significantly lower fuel intensity.
Air Traffic Control improvements are not a market-based decision; rather, they
are exogenously determined by public policy. In EPPA-A, tax rates for advanced
ATC are set to meet expected government expenditures on ATC infrastructure. A
more efficient solution would be a usage fee for ATC infrastructure charged to airlines.
While the fee would still be the result of a policy determination, airlines would have an
interest in the rate being set to keep pace with traffic growth, and to achieve whatever
efficiency gains maximize profits based on the policy and fuel-price constraints they
face.
Biofuels play a large role in reducing fuel consumption in EPPA-A, but are disal-
lowed from use in the aviation sector. By 2050, U.S. biofuel consumption is greater
than refined oil consumption in all non-aviation sectors. Reductions in refined oil
demand due to reduction in output and energy efficiency savings are even larger,
constituting more than half of total reductions. But reductions in aviation fuel use
are hard to come by; refined oil use by the aviation sector is only 18% lower in the
Yr
policy scenario than in the BAU case. More importantly, there are significant reduc-
tions still available from the portion of the household transportation sector which has
not switched to biofuels. Figure 6-2 shows the sectoral breakdown of refined oil use
changes in the policy scenario. At the model horizon, the marginal cost of biofuels is
still 14% higher than refined oil for aviation in the U.S., so while at some point in the
future aviation will need to switch to biofuels, it is likely the last sector which will
do so. This is not the case in all policy constrained regions; if biofuels with the same
incremental cost as cellulosic ethanol were available for aviation use, they would enter
into use in the Japanese aviation sector in 2030, and the European sector in 2045.
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Figure 6-2: Reductions are available in most other Sectors, but aviation reductions
are sparse
The aviation sector is key to economic expansion, but while its economic footprint
is large, relative to economy, its emissions are not. In the future, aviation emissions
will eventually need to be reduced, but both policy measures and investments in
research and infrastructure should achieve the cheapest reductions first. Given the
unlikelihood of a global sectoral aviation cap, there is no compelling reason why the
aviation sector should have an independent goal of carbon neutral growth after 2020,
especially if it takes place apart from an economy-wide cap. Aviation's inclusion in
the economy-wide cap offers the best chance for fair allocations of free permits and for
efficient reductions of emissions across sectors, but it is essential that aviation-specific
border adjustments fairly account for emissions permits or taxes purchased or paid
in other regions.
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Appendix A
Matrix Balancing Code
*this program rebalances the EPPA5 social accounting matrix.
$title Read the Social Accouting Matrix and Balance
*These are necessary EPPA Sets to perform the balance
SET I SECTORS /
CROP Agriculture -
LIVE Agriculture -
FORS Agriculture -
FOOD Food products
COAL Coal
OIL Crude Oil
ROIL Refined Oil
GAS Gas
ELEC
EINT
OTHR
SERV
TRAN
AIRT
CGD
SET
USA
CAN
MEX
JPN
ANZ
EUR
ROE
RUS
ASI
CHN
IND
BRA
AFR
MES
LAM
REA
crops
livestock
forestry
Electricity
Energy-intensive Industries
Other Industries
Services
Transport
Air Transport
Savings Good/;
R REGIONS /
United States
Canada
Mexico
Japan
Australia - New Zealand
Europe
Eastern Europe
Russia Plus
East Asia
China
India
Brazil
Africa
Middle East
Latin America
Rest of Asia /;
*llk and llkf are not real eppa sets, but are useful here
SET LLK/
LAB
LND
CAP/;
SET LLKF/
LAB
LND
CAP
FIX/;
SET E/
COAL
OIL
ROIL
GAS
ELEC/;
SET OIL/
OIL/;
alias (i,g);
alias (r,rr);
*include the data set you wish to modify:
$include airdat.dat
*include energy adjustments
$include adjustments.dat
*create flag to initialize energy adjustments or not
parameter adj;
adj = 1;
*make adjustments
xpO("usa","airt") = xpO("usa","airt") + xpO_adjustments;
xdcO("usa","airt") = xdcO("usa","airt") + xdcOadjustments;
xdpO(r,i,g) = xdpO(r,i,g) + xdpOadjustments(r,i,g);
display 'zombie';
display xpO, xdcO, xdpO;
eind("roil","airt",r)$adj = eind.airtadjustments(r);
eind("roil","tran",r)$adj = eind("roil","tran",r) + eindtranadjustments(r);
efd("roil",r)$adj = efd("roil",r) + efdadjustments(r);
*Because we want to use the Least Squares method of solvers, negatives pose a problem.
*The 'absolute value' function in gams is discontinuous, and none of the NLP solvers let
you use it
*For this reason, split any parameters with values <0 into a positive and negative
parameter.
*The positive parameters are added in the functions, and the negatives are subtracted.
parameters posptxyO, negptxyO;
posptxy0(r,g)$(ptxyO(r,g) ge 0) = ptxyO(r,g);
negptxy0(r,g)$(ptxy0(r,g) le 0) = ptxy0(r,g)*(-l);
parameters possavfO, negsavfO;
possavf0(r)$(savf0(r) ge 0) = savf0(r);
negsavf0(r)$(savf0(r) le 0) = savf0(r)*(-l);
parameters postrg0, negtrgO;
postrg0(r)$(trgO(r) ge 0) = trgO(r);
negtrgO(r)$(trgO(r) le 0) = trg0(r)*(-l);
parameters td, postd, negtd;
postd(r,g) = posptxyo(r,g)/xpO(r,g);
negtd(r,g) = negptxy0(r,g)/xpO(r,g);
* Balance the SAM using least squares
*declare variables for use in optimization
variable obj Objective -- least squares deviation;
positive
variable est_xpO(r,g) Estimate of production
estxdpO(r,i,g)
est-xmpO(r,i,g)
est_xdcO(r,g)
est-xmcO (r, g)
est_xdgO(r,g)
est-xmgO (r,g)
est_xdi0(r,g)
est_yst(g,r)
est_esO(r,g)
Estimate of domestic intermediate usage
Intermediate demand for imports
Estimate of domestic hhold demand
Estimate of imports for hhold cons
Estimate of government domestic demand
Estimate of government import demand
Estimate of investment demand
Estimate of exports of transportation
Estimate of exports
est_wtflowO(r,rr,g) Estimate of world trade flows
estxmO(r,g) Estimate of imports
esttx(g,rr,r) Estimate of export tax (fixed)
est_ytwr(i,g,rr,r) Estimate of trade margins
est..tm(g,rr,r) Estimate of import tariff (fixed)
est_consO(r) Estimate of total hhold consumption
estpcO(g,r) Estimate of price level (fixed)
est-kapdO(r,g) Intermediate demand for Kapital
est_labdO(r,g) Intermediate demand for Labor
est-ffactdO(r,g) Intermediate demand for Land
est-posptxyO(r,g
est..negptxyO(r,g
est_taxhO(r)
estsavhO (r)
est_tf(llk,g,r)
est-ti(i,g,r)
estpossavfO(r)
est-negsavfO(r)
estpgO (g, r)
est-postrgO(r)
est-negtrgO(r)
) Positive sectoral sum of excise tax (check these)?
) Negative sum of excise tax
Total tax revenue
Hhold savings?
Tax rate on fixed factors (fixed)
Tax rate on intermediates (fixed)
Positive foreign savings (capital flows into region r)
Negative foreign savings (capital flows out of region r)
Government price level (fixed)
Positive tax on government purchases
Negative tax on government purchases (check these)
*declare equations which will be passed to the solver
equations lsqobj Defines norm of the deviation with a least
objective
firnusalesbalance (r, g) firm income
firm-costbalance (r, g) firm expenditures
export.balance(r,g) export balance
import.balance(r,g) import balance
hhold.consumptionbalance(r) Household Consumption Balance
hholdgov_incomebalance(r) Household Income Balance
oilbal(oil) Oil Balance
foreignexbalance(r) Foreign Exchange Balance
savings-balance(r) Savings Balance
regional_balance(r) Regional Balance
tradeb.alance Trade Balance
importbalancecif(r,g); Import Balance (cost, insurance, freight)
squares
*obj is the sum of square difference between a variable and it's starting point: we try to
minimize this
lsqobj.. obj =e= 5 * sum((r,i,g)$xdpO(r,i,g), xdpO(r,i,g) * sqr(est.xdpO(r,i,g)/
xdpO (r, i, g) -1))
+ sum((r,i,g)$xpO(r,g), xpO(r,g) * sqr(estxpO(r,g)/xpO(r,g)-l))
+ sum((r,g)$esO(r,g), esO(r,g) * sqr(est-esO(r,g)/esO(r,g)-1))
+ sum((r,i,g)$xmp0(r,i,g), xmpO(r,i,g) * sqr(estxmpO(r,i,g)/xmpO(r,i,g)-1))
+ sum((r,g)$kapdO(r,g), kapdO(r,g) * sqr(est-kapd(r,g)/kapd(r,g)-l))
+ sum((r,g)$labdO(r,g), labdO(r,g) * sqr(est_labdO(r,g)/labdO(r,g)-1))
+ sum((r,g)$ffactdO(r,g), ffactdO(r,g) * sqr(estffactdO(r,g)/ffactdO(r,g)-1))
+ sum((r,g)$posptxyO(r,g), posptxyO(r,g) * sqr(est-posptxyO(r,g)/posptxyO(r,g)-l))
+ sum((r,g)$negptxyO(r,g), negptxyO(r,g) * sqr(est-negptxyO(r,g)/negptxyO(r,g)-l))
+ sum((r,g)$xdcO(r, g), xdcO(r,g) * sqr(estxdcO(r,g)/xdcO(r,g)-1))
+ sum((r,g)$xmcO(r,g), xmcO(r,g) * sqr(est-xmcO(r,g)/xmcO(r,g)-1))
+ sum((r,g)$xdgO(r,g), xdgO(r,g) * sqr(estxdgO(r,g)/xdgO(r,g)-l))
+ sum((r,g)$xmgO(r,g), xmgO(r,g) * sqr(estxmgO(r,g)/xmgO(r,g)-1))
+ sum((r,g)$xdiO(r,g), xdiO(r,g) * sqr(estxdi(r,g)/xdiO(r,g)-l))
+ sum((g,r)$vst(g,r), vst(g,r) * sqr(est-vst(g,r)/vst(g,r)-l))
+ sum((rr,r,g)$wtflowO(rr,r,g), wtflowO(rr,r,g) * sqr(est-wtflowO(rr,r,g)/wtflowO(rr
,r,g)-l))
+ sum((r,g)$xmO(r,g), xmO(r,g) * sqr(estxmO(r,g)/xmO(r,g)-1))
+ sum((g,rr,r)$tx(grr,r), tx(g,rr,r) * sqr(esttx(g,rr,r)/tx(g,rr,r)-1))
+ sum((i,g,rr,r)$vtwr(i,g,rr,r), vtwr(irg,rrr) * sqr(est..twr(i,g,rr,r)/vtwr(i,g,rr
,r)-1))
+ sum((g,rr,r)$tm(g,rrr), tm(g,rr,r) * sqr(est_.tm(g,rr,r)/tm(g,rr,r)-l))
+ sum((r)$consO(r), consO(r) * sqr(estconsO(r)/consO(r)-l))
+ sum((r,g)$pcO(g,r), pcO(g,r) * sqr(estpcO(g,r)/pcO(g,r)-1))
+ sum((r,g)$taxhO(r), taxhO(r) * sqr(est-taxh0(r)/taxh0(r)-l))
+ sum((r,g)$possavfO(r), possavfO(r) * sqr(estpossavfO(r)/possavfO(r)-l))
+ sum((r,g)$negsavf0(r), negsavf0(r) * sqr(estnegsavf0(r)/negsavf0(r)-l))
+ sum((r,g)$postrg0(r), postrgO(r) * sqr(est-postrgO(r)/postrgO(r)-l))
+ sum((r,g)$negtrg0(r), negtrgO(r) * sqr(est-negtrg0(r)/negtrgO(r)-l))
+ sum((r)$savh0(r), savh0(r) * sqr(estsavhO(r)/savhO(r)-1));
*these are the SAM balancing criteria:
firmsales_balance(r,g).. estxp0(r,g) =e= sum(i, est_xdp0(r,g,i)) + est_xdc0(r,g)
+ estjxdg0(r,g) + estxdi0(r,g) + estvst(g,r) + estes0(r,g);
firm-cost-balance(r,g).. estxpo(r,g) =e= sum(i, (est.xdpO(r,i,g)+ est.xmp0(r,i,g))*(l+
est-ti (i, g,r)) )
+ est-kapdO(r,g)*(+est-.tf("cap",g,r)) + est_labdO(r,g)*(l+esttf("lab",g,r))
+ est-ffactd0(r,g)*(l+est-tf("lnd",g,r)) + estposptxyO(r,g) - estnegptxyO(r,g)
export-balance(r,g).. est-esO(r,g) =e= sum(rr,est-wtflow0(rr,r,g));
importbalance(r,g).. est_xm0(r,g) =e= sum(rr, (estytflow0(r,rr,g)*(l+est__tx(g,rr,r)) +
sum(i,est-vtwr(i,g,rr,r)))*(l+esttm(g,rr,r)));
hholdconsumptionbalance(r).. estconsO(r) =e= sum(g, (estjxmc0(r,g)+est.xdcO(r,g))*
est-pc0(g,r));
hhold.gov_incomebalance(r).. est_.cons0(r) + sum(g, (est-xdg0(r,g)+est..xmgO(r,g))*est-pg0(g
,r)) + sum(g,est-xdi0(r,g)) =e=
sum(g,est_labd0(r,g)) + sum(g,est-kapdO(r,g)) + sum(g,est-ffactdO(r,g))
+ est-taxhO(r) + est-possavf0(r) - est-negsavf0(r);
oilbal(oil).. sum(R, est.XPO(R,"oil")) =e= sum(r,SUM(g,estXDPO(R,"OIL",g)) + est_XDCO(R,"
OIL") + estXDGO(R,"OIL") + estXDIO(R,"OIL")
+ estESO (R, "OIL"));
foreignexbalance(r).. sum((g,rr), estwtflow0(rr,r,g)*(l+esttx(g,r,rr)))+ sum(g,
est_yst(g,r)) + estpossavf0(r) - est-negsavfO(r) =e=
sum((g,rr), (estwtflowO(r,rr,g)*(l+est-tx(g,rr,r)) + sum(i,est-vtwr(i,g,rr,r))
savings-balance(r).. est-savh0(R) + est-possavf0(r) - est..negsavfO(r) =e= sum(g,estxdi0(r
,g));
regional-balance(r).. sum(g, est_labdO(r,g)+estkapd0(r,g)+estffactd0(r,g)) +
est-possavfO(r) - est-negsavf0(r) + est-taxh0(r) =e=
sum(g,est-xdg(r,g)+estxmgO(r,g)) + est-postrgO(r) - estnegtrg0(r) + sum(g,
est-xdi0(r,g)) + est-cons0(r);
trade-balance.. sum((i,r), estvyst(i,r)) =e= sum((i,g,rr,r), est-vtwr(i,g,rr,r));
importbalance-cif(r,g).. est_xmo(r,g) =e= sum(i,est_.xmp0(r,g,i)) + est.xmcO(r,g) +
est-xmgO(r,g);
*set variable levels to initial values
est.xpO.l(r,g) = xp0(r,g);
est.xdp.l(r,i,g) = xdpO(r,i,g);
est_xdcO.l(r,g) = xdcO(r,g);
est.xdgO.l(r,g) = xdg0(r,g);
est-.xmgO.l(r,g) = xmg0(r,g);
estxdi0.l(r,g) = xdiO(r,g);
est..st.l(g,r) = vst(g,r);
estes0.l(r,g) = es0(r,g);
estwtflow0.l(r,rr,g) = wtflow0(r,rr,g);
estxm0.l(r,g) = xmO(r,g);
est_vtwr.l(i,g,rr,r) = vtwr(i,g,rr,r);
estcons0.l(r) = consO(r);
estxmc0.l(r,g) = xmc0(r,g);
est_.xmp0.l(r,i,g) = xmp0(r,i,g);
estkapd0.l(r,g) = kapd0(r,g);
estlabdo.l(r,g) = labdO(r,g);
est_ffactd0.l(r,g) = ffactdO(r,g);
est-posptxy0.l(r,g) = posptxyO(r,g);
est.negptxyO.l(r,g) = negptxyO(r,g);
est-possavfO.l(r) = possavf0(r);
est-negsavf0.l(r) = negsavf0(r);
est-postrgO.l(r) = postrg0(r);
est-negtrgO.l(r) = negtrg0(r);
est_taxh0.l(r) = taxh0(r);
est-savh0.l(r) = savhO(r);
*est_postd.l(r,g) = postd(r,g);
*est-negtd.l(r,g) = negtd(r,g);
*prices and tax rates are fixed
est-pgO.fx(g,r) = pgO(g,r);
est_tx.fx(g,rr,r) = tx(g,rr,r);
est.pcO.fx(g,r) = pcO(g,r);
est_tm.fx(g,rr,r) = tm(g,rr,r);
est.tf.fx(llk,g,r) = tf(llk,g,r);
est_ti.fx(i,g,r) = ti(i,g,r);
*fix all variables which were originally at zero to zero
estxpO.fx(r,g)$(xpO(r,g) = 0) = 0;
estxdpO.fx(r,i,g)$(xdp0(r,i,g) = 0) = 0;
est.xdc.fx(r,g)$(xdc0(r,g) = 0) = 0;
est.xdg.fx(r,g)$(xdg0(r,g) = 0) = 0;
est.xmg.fx(r,g)$(xdg0(r,g) = 0) = 0;
est_xdio.fx(r,g)$(xdi0(r,g) = 0) = 0;
est-.vst.fx(g,r)$(vst(g,r) = 0) = 0;
est_eso.fx(r,g)$(es0(r,g) = 0) = 0;
estwtflow.fx(r,rr,g)$(wtflow0(r,rr,g) = 0) = 0;
est-.xm.fx(r,g)$(xm0(r,g) = 0) = 0;
esttx.fx(g,rr,r)$(tx(g,rr,r) = 0) = 0;
estvtwr.fx(i,g,rr,r)$(vtwr(i,g,rr,r) = 0) = 0;
est..tm.fx(g,rr,r)$(tm(g,rr,r) = 0) = 0;
est_tf.fx(llk,g,r)$(tf(llk,g,r) = 0) = 0;
est-ti.fx(i,g,r)$(ti(i,g,r) = 0) = 0;
est.pg0.fx(g,r)$(pg0(g,r) = 0) = 0;
est.pc.fx(g,r)$(pc0(g,r) = 0) = 0;
est_cons0.fx(r)$(cons0(r) = 0) = 0;
est_xmco.fx(r,g)$(xmc0(r,g) = 0) = 0;
est-xmpO.fx(r,i,g)$(xmp0(r,i,g) = 0) = 0;
estkapd.fx(r,g)$(kapd0(r,g) = 0) = 0;
est-labd.fx(r,g)$(labd0(r,g) = 0) = 0;
estffactd.fx(r,g)$(ffactd0(r,g) = 0) = 0;
est-posptxy.fx(r,g)$(posptxy0(r,g) = 0) = 0;
est-negptxy.fx(r,g)$(negptxyO(r,g) = 0) = 0;
estpossavf0.fx(r)$(possavf0(r) = 0) = 0;
est_negsavfO.fx(r)$(negsavf0(r) = 0) = 0;
est-postrgO.fx(r)$(postrgO(r) = 0) = 0;
est-negtrgO.fx(r)$(negtrg0(r) = 0) = 0;
est-taxh0.fx(r)$(taxh0(r) = 0) = 0;
est_savh0.fx(r)$(savh0(r) = 0) = 0;
*est-postd.fx(r,g)$(postd(r,g) = 0) = 0;
*est_negtd.fx(r,g)$(negtd(r,g) = 0) = 0;
*pass the equations to the model
model lsqr/
lsqobj
firm_sales_balance
firmcost_balance
hhold.consumption.balance
hhold_gov_income_balance
exportbalance
importbalance
oilbal
foreignexbalance
savingsbalance
regional_balance
trade.balance
importbalance_..cif/;
*solve!!!
option NLP=pathnlp;
solve lsqr using NLP minimizing obj;
*put everything back into its original parameter
xpO(r,g) = estxpO.l(r,g);
xdpO(r,i,g) = est-xdpO.l(r,i,g);
xdcO(r,g) = est_.xdcO.l(r,g);
xdgO(r,g) = est_.xdgO.l(r,g);
xmgO(r,g) = estjxmgO.l(r,g);
xdiO(r,g) = est_xdi.l(r,g);
vst(g,r) = est-vst.l(g,r);
esO(r,g) = est-esO.l(r,g);
wtflowO(r,rr,g) = est-wtflowO.1(r,rr,g);
xmO(r,g) = est_.xmO.l(r,g);
vtwr(i,g,rr,r) = estvtwr.l(i,g,rr,r);
consO(r) = est_consO.l(r);
xmcO(r,g) = est_xmcO.l(r,g);
xmp(r,i,g) = est-.xmp.l(r,i,g);
kapdO(r,g) = est-kapdO.l(r,g);
labdO(r,g) = estlabdO.l(r,g);
ffactdO(r,g) = est-ffactdO.1(r,g);
ptxyO(r,g) = est-posptxyO.l(r,g) - estnegptxyO.l(r,g);
savfO(r) = est-possavfO.l(r) - est.negsavfO.l(r);
trgO(r) = est-postrgO.l(r) - est..negtrgO.l(r);
taxhO(r) = esttaxhO.l(r);
savhO(r) = est-savhO.l(r);
pgO(g,r) = est.pgO.l(g,r);
tx(g,rr,r) = est.tx.l(g,rr,r);
pcO(g,r) = estpc.l(g,r);
tm(g,rr,r) = est-tm.l(g,rr,r);
tf(llk,g,r) = esttf.l(llk,g,r);
ti(i,g,r) = est-ti.l(i,g,r);
*initialize the put file
file balance /balance.dat/;
*For brevity's sake, the reporting has been redacted, but uses the
*same method as eppaput.gms
executejunload "all.gdx"
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